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Introduction
The UK is introducing value based pricing (VBP) for new drugs, building on the role of the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in assessing the cost-effectiveness of NHS treatments to improve the efficiency with which drugs are priced and used. Other countries also are using health technology assessment (HTA) to inform pricing and reimbursement decisions for medicines.
The VBP proposal from the Department of Health in the UK indicates that other factors not related to the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) should be considered, including: burden of disease (defined as combined unmet need and severity), the degree of therapeutic innovation, and health related benefits to patients not measured by the QALY. A societal perspective also should be taken, including benefits and costs outside health gain and health system costs (DH, 2011) .
We can abstract beyond the specific UK proposals to identify the following elements of value.
1. Health effect is usually the single most important benefit of health technologies. Direct health effects can be measured using indicators of efficacy or effectiveness such as the QALY, which combines changes in the quality and length of life of an intervention.
2. Any cost-offsets within the healthcare system are a second key benefit. Savings to the health care system (offset by the additional cost of using the technology) are usually included in standard cost -effectiveness analyses.
Other elements of value fall into three distinct types.
1. A QALY's "value" to society may be higher or lower depending on who gets it. This might depend on the characteristics of the patients receiving the health gain (for example, age), on the nature of the illness in question, or on the pre-treatment level of health or disability of the patients (Shah, 2009) . The UK VBP proposals suggest that the value of the QALY should be weighted by disease severity.
2. Elements of benefit to the patient that are not necessarily captured in the QALY (or any other measure of health gain), including:
a. Health related quality of life aspects not well reflected in a generic measure. For example, vitality is an important aspects of cancer patients' health, but it is not explicitly included in EQ-5D (Garau et al., 2011) , which is one of the most used health measurement systems.
b. Health care process related aspects, such as being treated with dignity, at a convenient time and location, and after only a short wait. These may have health consequences, but the preference for them (as reflected in patients' stated preferences, or in political targets; for example, waiting times) goes beyond any health gain.
3. Information for the patient that, for example, enables life style choices to be made independent of any health effects 4. Other costs and benefits beyond those to patients and the NHS, such as the benefits to employers of getting people back to work more quickly and quality of life improvements for carers
The purpose of the paper is to discuss how a VBP framework also could be applied to diagnostics. In particular, we show how the incremental benefits generated by adding diagnostics to a health care pathway can include not only health gains (some of which may go beyond those captured by the QALY) and treatment cost savings, but also increased information available to patients to make decisions on treatment and/or their future lifestyle "behaviours".
We begin by outlining a framework with five pathways to identify the value of diagnostics. We then discuss three key process issues: aggregating value elements to inform price decisions, separating the value of test-treatment combinations, and designing optimal institutional processes for the value assessment of diagnostics. We conclude with policy recommendations.
Framework to Assess the Value of Diagnostics
Diagnostic tests include a broad range of techniques varying in their (1) level of complexity (from a simple clinical assessment to complex in vitro diagnostics assays) and (2) purpose (to determine the risk of developing a disease, the presence of a disease, an individual's prognosis, or treatment response). From an economic perspective, any type of diagnostic test can enhance the level of information about a specific clinical condition or health state and so reduce or eliminate uncertainty (Garrison and Austin, 2007 Another type of uncertainty is the perceived value of information to patients of reduced uncertainty as to their medical condition independent of the expected health outcomes (Han, Klein and Arora, 2011) . The literature has defined it as the "value of knowing" or, as Ash,
Patton and Hershey (1990) put it, "knowing for the sake of knowing", even if the condition is untreatable (Neumann et al., 2012) . Patients may value information from a test regardless of the impact on their treatment strategy for the following reasons:
a. Decreased level of "ambiguity", a situation where probabilities of certain outcomes are highly uncertain (Ellsberg, 1961) . There is evidence that people dislike ambiguous situations and prefer to receive information regardless of its nature ("bad" and "good" news) (Kenen, 1996; Neumann et al., 2012) . In some cases, of course, test results can yield disutility. Patients are not always indifferent to the outcome of the test (Ash, Patton and Hershey, 1990 ). In the case of degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's disease with limited treatment options and a high level of emotional burden, fear of living with the possibility of developing the disease can be very distressing. If the disutility associated with "bad news" is higher than the utility gain of "good news", then testing may not be to the benefit of the patient. In those situations, the choice as whether to test should ultimately be left to the individual patient as part of an informed decision making process involving all interested parties.
b. Provide reassurance to patients (value of "rule out"), particularly to those already identified as "at risk". A person with family history of a certain genetic disease can value a predictive test providing proof of the absence of, or lower chance of contracting, the disease in the future (Kenen, 1996) .
In addition, individuals might want to undertake a test with no treatment options because the results will affect their family/life planning, including choices related to personal finances, work and leisure time (Lee, Neumann and Rizzo, 2010) . a. Epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) mutation test predicts response to tyrosine kinase inhibitor (TKIs) treatments, such as gefitinib for non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC). Gefitinib initially was approved based on positive Phase II trial results, but subsequently withdrawn when Phase III failed to show a survival benefit. After the identification of EGFR mutations and its association positive response rate to TKIs, gefitinib received regulatory approval in the EU and other markets in combination with the EGFR mutation test. b. The human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2/neu) test is used in breast cancer to predict a patient's response to trastuzumab. For example, NICE in the UK recommends trastuzumab for advanced breast cancer and for adjuvant treatment of early-stage HER2/neu positive breast cancer as estimates of cost per QALY of the test-treatment combination were found below the standard threshold. c. The ALK FISH test is used in combination with crizotinib. The treatment recently licensed in the US targets a small subset --between 3% and 8% --of NSCLC patients with an ALK-positive molecular abnormality. Research on crizotinib started before the discovery that a fusion of two genes (ALK and EML4) could cause some lung cancers. However, the subsequent development of the ALK FISH test has accelerated the development process and increased the likelihood of crizotinib delivering health benefits and commercial value (Young, 2011) . 5. Oncotype DX and MammaPrint are multi-gene assays that can identify patients with a high risk of recurrence, guide intervention decisions, and reduce the risk of dispensing unnecessary chemotherapy. Criteria currently used to predict risk of recurrence in breast cancer patients following surgery are not very accurate. As a result, many patients are either over-or under-treated with adjuvant chemotherapy.
The magnitude of the value created also will vary according to a number of test related parameters.
In particular, low specificity and low sensitivity test accuracy will decrease the potential net gains to patients and to the health system from testing. For example, patients who are wrongly identified as responders (false positive) and those who are wrongly identified as non-responders (false negative)
will miss the opportunity to receive a clinical decision from which they can benefit.
There are further implications if a diagnostic does not provide a binary response (positive or negative, yes or no). With a binary test, the overall patient population can be split into two subgroups -i.e. expected responders and non-responders. When a test does not provide a binary answer, for example, when it is aimed at measuring the level of individual protein expression, then there will be a patient subpopulation for which the test does not provide a clear-cut response. This subgroup potentially could benefit from the treatment, but uncertainty about treatment effectiveness is not substantially reduced with the use of a test. When this subpopulation is large relatively to the other two subsets (the "yes" and "no") and the cost of the test is high compared to the cost of the treatment, the test-treatment combination might not be as cost-effective as the use of treatment on its own.
Options for Aggregating Elements of Value into a VBP
We have explored how diagnostics create value as well as incurring costs. Translating these elements of value into a value based price the payer is willing to reimburse requires the different types of "value" to be aggregated. The principal options for combining value elements that are not specific to processes for diagnostics are:
1. Converting all value into monetary terms -usually called the "net monetary benefit" approach (Claxton and Posnett, 1996) 2.
Considering each type of benefit in terms of its own "unit of measurement"', and applying a set of weights to each benefit type to represent the rates at which different types of benefit may be traded-off with each other, and scores to indicate how well each benefit type is achieved by the medicine in question. This is called a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approach (Devlin and Sussex, 2011) .
3.
Selecting one principal measure of benefit, the default option being QALYs, as the "numeraire" and then up-rating or down-rating that measure using a series of weights to reflect the magnitudes of other types of benefit. Another option would be to assess (using stated-preference approaches) how people trade off QALY gains with other value elements such as informational benefits that are independent of health gains.
4.
Using a "deliberative process" of the sort used by NICE and other HTA bodies where considerations other than QALYs are assessed and weighted qualitatively. In most deliberative processes, the relative weights given to the elements of value may remain implicit.
The principal approaches are considered in more detail in Table 2 , which highlights some key issues and advantages of each, as well as common challenges. 
Attribution of Value in a Diagnostic-Treatment Combination
When a treatment and a diagnostic are used in combination to target a subgroup of patients, the value created is a "joint product" as defined in economics; the total value created depends on the combination and the attribution of some portion of the value to one or the other is essentially arbitrary. This presents a challenge to the concept and operationalization of VBP for both diagnostics and treatments.
We can illustrate this arbitrariness by considering an extreme situation in which (1) the treatment cannot be used without the test (let us assume the adverse effects are very high for the "wrong" patients) and (2) the test has no other application. Together a value of, say, 100, is created. If the test is taken away, the treatment has zero value. If the treatment is taken away the test has zero value. In other (less extreme) situations, the test may increase the value of the drug by enabling it to be targeted: let us assume, for example, that the net benefit to the health system of the drug on its own is 60 and with the test the net benefit increases to 100. Therefore the test adds a value of 40.
The test also has some value in the absence of the drug as it can be used to help target treatments that are much less effective. On the other hand, suppose the value of the test without the drug is 20.
The drug increases the value to 100 and so adds 80 to the value of the test on its own. Thus we can see that there is no "correct" way of dividing the joint value (of 100) of the test and drug between them. We can allocate the benefit using a rule, (and we have illustrated two), but it is essentially arbitrary.
This paper cannot "solve" this thorny theoretical problem, but some key elements to consider can be identified. Garrison and Austin (2007) have pointed out that how value is allocated across patients, payers, diagnostic manufactures and drug manufacturers (the "value capture") depends on the institutional context --for example, whether the drug treatment was priced before the diagnostic was available, the relative strength of intellectual property protection for drugs and diagnostics, whether pricing and reimbursement of the medicine or diagnostic is flexible or administered, and other factors. We have shown in our simple example above that one rule is to look at which comes first and then allocate to the other one the residual of the joint value (recognising that the value attribution is different depending on which one comes first).
Who "captures" this value influences how much R&D is undertaken and therefore whether value is likely to be created in the first place. In this context, VBP principles should pay close attention to "dynamic" as well as "static" efficiency. Static efficiency is concerned with whether a treatment or diagnostic is cost-effective given current prices and usage patterns. Dynamic efficiency is concerned with how P&R policies influence the incentive to innovative: do they encourage the optimal rate of innovation?
In the case of an "at-launch" diagnostic-treatment (Dx-Tx) combination then, providing that overall value is identified, assessed and rewarded by payers, both drug and diagnostic manufacturers have the potential to make appropriate commercial arrangements with each other to maximise their joint opportunity for creating value 1 . However, this may be more difficult when a diagnostic test alone is being considered. This may be the case when a new test may be able to increase the overall joint value of an existing Dx-Tx combination because of, say, greater accuracy yielding fewer false positives and false negatives.
When it is possible to develop different platforms or versions of the same test (for example, hospital laboratories can create "in-house" toolkits for the same marker), there is a risk of "class effect" reimbursement recommendations (Drummond, Griffiths and Tarricone, 2009) If the rewards for targeting such a diagnostic are not sufficient to support appropriate evidence development, then the development and use of the test may be suboptimal. As Garrison and Austin (2007) noted, to the extent that intellectual property rights (IPR) are weak, and it is relatively easy and inexpensive to develop "follow-on" tests, then the market forces will be similar to those for a class of generic drugs. Price will be driven down to marginal production and distribution cost. This will not provide sufficient incentive for "first-in-class" tests to produce the optimal amount of supporting evidence. VBP may need to be supplemented with other incentives, such as data or marketing exclusivity or public subsidies (for example, to fund evidence generation), to encourage socially optimal levels of innovation in diagnostic testing. Further discussion around IPR issues for diagnostics is beyond the remit of this paper.
Three Examples of Institutional Processes for Diagnostics
Historically, pricing and reimbursement systems for diagnostics have focused on costs (Garrison and Austin, 2007) . This has meant that the price of a new diagnostic is fixed based on the price of existing tests with similar clinical use or similar characteristics, or based on production cost. For example, in the US, a number of diagnostics are reimbursed through a combination of reimbursement codes describing laboratory protocol stages (Gustavsen, Phillips and Pothier, 2010) .
There is an emerging tendency among countries, such as the UK and Australia, however, to extend HTA arrangements to diagnostic tests.
The UK system
In the UK, NICE was established to provide an independent assessment of the cost-effectiveness of medical technologies to guide decision making in the NHS. In 2009-2010 the Diagnostics Assessment Programme (DAP) was created to assess diagnostic technologies within NICE's remit (NICE, 2011).
DAP's responsibility includes genetic tests with a medical purpose. It focuses mainly on "standalone" diagnostics. Companion diagnostics, which identify subpopulations that respond best to a new drug, usually are assessed alongside the pharmaceutical within a NICE Technology Appraisal.
DAP recognises that the evaluation of diagnostics differs from that of treatments, mainly because diagnostics do not have a direct impact on health outcomes. However, the current DAP approach does not allow the decision maker to consider a broad set of outcomes, including the value of information on patients' conditions independent of health gains. This is because the current method very closely follows that used for medicines; the measure of patient benefit is based purely on the QALY.
In the case of companion diagnostics assessed in conjunction with treatments, the incremental value offered by each of the two technologies is an issue, as discussed in section 4. In the NICE appraisal of trastuzumab for the treatment of early-stage HER2-positive breast cancer (NICE, 2006) , it was accepted that an assay had to be used to identify the relevant patient subpopulation, according to the marketing authorisation. The guidance states that the cost of HER2 testing was included in the economic analysis, but it did not explicitly include the amount as it did for the treatment.
Furthermore, there was no explicit mention of test specificity and sensitivity.
The Australian system
Australia currently has a dedicated HTA process for new diagnostics including both stand-alone and From November 2012, a new coordinated process will be implemented for "co-dependent technologies". 1 An "integrated" application combines information developed by the diagnostic manufacturer, the drug manufacturer, and by both. Different funding programs mean, however, that listing decisions for diagnostics and treatments included in the "co-dependent technologies" category still will be made separately by PBAC and MSAC.
An important issue relates to the draft December 2010 guidelines on evidence requirements for codependent technologies. It proposes a new evidence hierarchy to demonstrate the clinical benefits of tests which includes, as the preferred option, a patient randomisation to use of test ("direct evidence"). However, not considered is that the choice of the most adequate study type and design should be informed by an explicit consideration of the added value generated by each type of evidence compared with the cost and feasibility of collection.
The US system
The arrangements in US managed care organizations to assess drugs and diagnostics vary. In most cases, payers have formulary committees that consider the value of new drugs, but no similar arrangements for assessing the value of diagnostics. Diagnostic reimbursement varies widely (Housman, 2011) . Diagnostics are generally reimbursed in both the public and private sectors on a crude cost-based coding system. Government payers --Medicare and Medicaid --have reimbursement levels that vary by state. Test manufacturers must negotiate with private payers individually by test and procedure code. The reimbursement by code within a private payer typically ranges from 60% to 110% of the Medicare reimbursement by procedure (Gustavsen, Phillips and Pothier, 2010) . Specific tests usually do not have a unique code and usually cost less than $500.
If the standard coding system can be avoided, the US health care system may be willing to pay for at least some elements of value. Oncotype DX was not developed as a companion diagnostic, being launched independently of a chemotherapy treatment, thereby putting the requirement to secure value based reimbursement squarely on the assay manufacturer.
Under the current procedure-based coding mechanism, the 21-gene assay, using the procedurebased code stacking approach, would have totalled approximately $580 using a Medicare fee schedule basis (Gustavsen, Phillips and Pothier, 2010) .
Instead, the manufacturer pursued a value-based pricing model utilising diagnostic clinical trial and patient outcome studies to demonstrate clinical differentiation and cost-effectiveness when the 21-gene assay was utilized for node-negative breast cancer patients. The main focus of costeffectiveness argument was the cost-offset obtained by not undertaking expensive chemotherapy treatment for women at low risk of disease recurrence. As the first in the market to utilize this model, they were able to achieve reimbursement for the assay at roughly seven times the codestacking reimbursement (i.e. around $3,500). This was by no means a trivial or quick undertaking: it took over four years to obtain nearly 90% payer coverage (Gustavsen et al., 2010) .
Value based pricing for this test was aided by its first-mover advantage, the importance of the costoffset (as opposed to the value of any health effects), and investment in data collection and publication.
Proposed institutional processes for diagnostics
There are several factors to trade-off in designing institutional arrangements.
First, it is important to build up experience of dealing with HTA for diagnostics as there are learning effects linked to cumulative experience. The particular issues for diagnostics include:
1. Generating and interpreting evidence on aspects of benefit, such as information for patients, that are less likely to occur in drug appraisal 2. Recognising the different circumstances for feasible study design and evidence collection for diagnostics as compared to drugs (for a discussion see Drummond, Griffiths and Tarricone, 2009; Taylor and Iglesias, 2009) . If pricing and reimbursement systems do not capture the full benefits brought to society by diagnostics and there is no sufficient protection of IPR, diagnostic manufacturers will not have incentives to invest in evidence development to raise the standard of clinical data available to support the case for using a test 3. The specific incremental characteristics of competitive tests with similar clinical use and how these may or may not translate into incremental value or cost savings for the payer Second, there is a need to consider the possible economies of scale of having a separate committee for diagnostics, which could increase throughput. At the same time, it is critical to achieve synergies across drugs and diagnostics in three respects:
1. there are economies of scope from one group dealing with both drugs and diagnostics 2. the joint product nature of an "at launch" combination requires one group to review both technologies in one package 3. the health system should be looking for the same value across all technologies, which requires a consistent approach to willingness to pay for value This suggests that there is a case for two types of institutional arrangement: (1) a separate diagnostics committee to develop and use diagnostics-specific expertise --however, there may be a trade-off if there are not enough decisions to justify a distinct committee and (2) a joint drugdiagnostic review of "at launch" technologies, logically done by the drug committee, to exploit synergies across diagnostics and drugs. However, most drug committees lack of expertise in the diagnostics area. This could be addressed by involving a sub-group of the diagnostics committee in any deliberations of the drug committee on drug-test combinations or by overlapping membership.
Which route is followed for the appraisal of a diagnostic test would depend on the following characteristics:
1 Other situations related to the evolution of the market for treatments linked to diagnostics can arise.
For example, second-in-class medicines using an existing test may be developed such as lapatinib, which employs the same testing regimen as trastuzumab for selecting women with metastatic HER2-positive breast cancer. In those cases, the assessment of two or more drug-test combinations could be done via the drug process review with a focus on the comparison between the treatments outcomes.
It would be essential that both diagnostic-dedicated and drug processes use a common, comprehensive approach to assessing value, using the one of the approaches to weighting value that is set out in Table 1 above. For example, if an MCDA approach is used to assess the value of drugs, it also should be used to assess the value of diagnostics, ideally using a consistent set of weights to recognise value from whatever source.
Conclusions
We have argued for a value based approach for pricing and reimbursement that reward innovation in diagnostics and drugs. We have set out possible institutional arrangements to support this. These include sending combined "at-launch" drug-test combinations to a drug assessment committee and establishing a separate specialist committee to review diagnostic tests that lie outside of an at- to assessing the value of diagnostics or drugs. In Australia, the common methodology needs to be supported by synergies in decision making and a realistic view of evidence development. In the US, an important precedent has been set by Oncotype DX for pricing for a diagnostic by value (as opposed to by cost). However, evidence was primarily around cost offset rather than health gain, and it has taken several years for the test to achieve comprehensive cover. Both public and private sector payers need to bring a value-based approach and specialist expertise to diagnostic reimbursement decisions.
A value-based approach to pricing is necessary, but not sufficient, to stimulate the development of new diagnostic tests. Issues such as IPR also may have to be addressed if sufficient evidence is to be generated to meet the requirements of payers.
